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UDICIAL opinions on land use typically impact a single landowner
party's use or development of a tract he owns or controls. While
opinions in these cases have precedential impact for other landown-
ers, developers, and builders, their impact is usually somewhat amelio-
rated. During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court issued an
opinion directly affecting thousands, if not millions, of people who own
property adjacent to or visit beaches along the Gulf Coast.' The opinion
strengthened private property owner rights at the expense of those claim-
ing public beach access. This Texas Supreme Court opinion falls right on
the heels of a United States Supreme Court opinion regarding beaches
and private property rights involving Gulf-front land in Florida.2
Many land use opinions rendered during the Survey period concerned
landowners' and developers' ability to name a governmental entity as a
party in breach of development contract or ordinance and statutory con-
struction cases. Developers often enter into agreements with cities or
counties constructing infrastructure and defining development rights for
* B.A., Austin College; J.D., University of Texas; M.P.A., University of Texas.
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1. Severance v. Patterson, No. 09-0387, 2010 WL 4371438 (Tex. Nov. 5, 2010).
2. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592
(2010).
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particular tracts of property. The construction and enforceability of an
ordinance, plat, zoning, or other documents necessitate naming the gov-
ernmental entity as a party in many land use disputes. Local governmen-
tal entity defendants often use sovereign immunity as a defense to being
named as a party, much less ever reaching the merits of a case. Numer-
ous appellate courts struggled with the extent of the immunity doctrine
during the survey period.
In addition to these two major judicial trends, many other opinions on
land use matters were handed down during the survey period. All in all,
this was one of the most active years in memory.
I. PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS
The Texas Gulf Coast contains over 367 miles of shoreline. Histori-
cally, there was tension between owners of property adjacent to beach
areas and public access to the ocean. According to the Texas Open
Beaches Act (OBA), a statutory "rolling easement" assured public beach
access without compensating adjoining landowners.3 Under the OBA, a
public beach's boundaries extend from the lowest waterline inward to the
vegetation line where plants naturally take root.4 The line of vegetation
frequently moves due to winds, waves, tides, storms, and hurricanes. Be-
cause of storm events, erosion, and changing tide patterns, the public ac-
cess easement to the beach constantly changes.
A. TEXAS CASE LAW
In Severance v. Patterson, the Texas Supreme Court upheld a land-
owner's challenge to portions of the OBA.5 Severance purchased prop-
erty on Galveston Island in 2005. Hurricane Rita moved the vegetation
line so that her house was entirely seaward of the vegetation line. 6 The
state viewed her house as now being on a public beach. The Texas Gen-
eral Land Office then sent notice that her house could be condemned
under the OBA because it was on the public access portion of the beach.
Severance filed suit in federal court, and the Fifth Circuit sent the follow-
ing three certified questions to the Texas Supreme Court: (1) does Texas
recognize a "rolling" beach easement; (2) if a rolling beach easement ex-
ists, does it come from common law or the OBA; and (3) to what extent
may a property owner receive compensation for landward migration of
the rolling easement? 7
The supreme court differentiated between a "wet" and "dry" beach. 8
A wet beach is under tidal waters at some time during the day, owned by
the state, and clearly entitled to public use. A dry beach exists from high
3. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.011 (West 2011).
4. Id.
5. Severance, 2010 WL 4371438, at *24.
6. Id. at *2.
7. Id. at *1.
8. Id. at *4.
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tide to the vegetation line, is often privately owned, and the right to pub-
lic use is not preserved under the OBA. A dry beach can be a public
beach if public access was previously established by a written document
or continuous use similar to a prescriptive easement. 9 The question
before the supreme court was whether the movement of the vegetation
line seaward "rolls" the public easement into Severance's property.10
The supreme court acknowledged property boundaries along coastal
waters are dynamic and adjust because of both erosion and accretion (the
enlargement of land)." Avulsion, on the other hand, is a sudden and
perceptible change that does not affect property boundaries.' 2 The ma-
jority opinion held that while accretion can add to a private property
owner's land, the state cannot add to a public beach through avulsion.13
As to the first certified question, the supreme court held the State does
not have a right to use private property unless an easement was legally
created. 14 The supreme court could not find any record of such an ease-
ment ever being established on Severance's tract. 15 While losing land to
the public as it becomes a wet beach is an expected risk, it was unreasona-
ble to hold a public easement would encumber additional portions of the
landowner's tract. 16 The supreme court addressed the first question by
answering that a public beachfront easement does not "roll.' 7 Thus,
there was no need to answer the second certified question.
As to the third question, the supreme court found enforcing a rolling
easement, as requested by the state, would constitutionally deprive the
private property owner of a protected property right.' 8 If the state en-
forces the rolling easement, then the private property owner is entitled to
just compensation.' 9
Justice Medina, in a dissent joined by Justice Lehrmann, argued the
majority opinion would have major repercussions on Texas coastal prop-
erty ownership. 20 As to the first certified question regarding whether
Texas historically recognizes "rolling" easements, Justice Medina re-
sponded in the affirmative.21 He cites numerous appellate courts' hold-
ings, supporting the fact that there is an implied easement of use of the
beaches for 200 years, and the long-standing enforcement of the OBA.22
As to the second certified question, the dissent argued that while the
OBA is consistent with common law, the source of public beachfront
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at *10.
12. Id.
13. Id. at *11.
14. Id. at *8.
15. Id. at *13.
16. Id. at *10.
17. Id. at *13.
18. Id.
19. Id. at *14.
20. Id. at *17 (Medina, J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. Id. at *17-21.
20111
SMU LAW REVIEW
easements is common law.23 The OBA does not create, but merely en-
forces these easements.24 As to the third certified question, Justice Me-
dina argued compensation is not due to private landowners whose
property becomes subject to the "rolling" easement.25 For property pur-
chased after 1986, landowners were warned of the preexisting public
easement of a dry beach in their closing documents. Therefore, these
landowners have no investment-backed expectations. For property pur-
chased before 1986, the state simply enforces the common law as a single
easement with dynamic boundaries.26 Similarly, the landowner is not en-
titled to compensation under Texas regulatory takings law. 27
The Severance holding will curtail the OBA's reach and create uncer-
tainty regarding the public beach access boundaries. There is a possibility
of more disputes between public beach users and property owners and an
increase in litigation over the location of property lines and public beach.
B. FEDERAL CASE LAW
About five months before the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Severance, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against property owners adja-
cent to the Florida beach. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Flor-
ida Department of Environmental Protection, the Supreme Court decided
Florida Gulf-front property owners were not entitled to compensation
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment when a state beach
restoration project separated their private property from the water's
edge. 28 The facts in this case are different than those in Severance be-
cause Florida attempted to add sand to the public beach.29
The City of Destin and Walton County sought permits to add sand
along the shoreline. A group of beachfront-property owners objected on
the ground that the new beach area would be open to the public and
would redefine boundaries of their property.30
The Florida Supreme Court held the landowners never had the right to
use the beach in front of their homes once it was renourished under Flor-
ida law and thus no compensation was due.31 It described the right to
accretion as a future contingent interest with no private property rights to
contact with the ocean.32 The landowners challenged the Florida court's
decision on the grounds that the court reinterpreted established state law
so that the judicial decision itself constituted a taking.33
23. Id. at *21.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *22.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *23.
28. 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2612-13 (2010).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2600.
31. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105, 1118
(Fla. 2008).
32. Id. at 1112.
33. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2600.
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The Court explained all property in Florida seaward of the Gulf of
Mexico's mean high-water line belongs to the state, while Gulf-front
property owners ordinarily own the land or beach between that line and
their homes.34 Florida case law held the state owned the wet beach and
therefore had the right to fill it. 35 If an avulsion further exposed previ-
ously submerged land, that land belongs to the state even if it keeps the
adjoining private property owner from contacting the sea water. 36 Be-
cause the Florida Supreme Court's decision was consistent with prior case
law, Florida did not violate the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. 37
In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito and Thomas, argued the Court should declare the Tak-
ings Clause applicable not only to legislative and executive actions, but
also to judicial actions. 38 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Sotomayor,
argued the Constitution's Due Process Clause adequately protects prop-
erty owners from judicial elimination of existing property rights and
therefore no new judicial doctrine was needed.39 Justice Breyer, joined
by Justice Ginsburg, concluded no taking had occurred and questions sur-
rounding judicial takings need not be addressed.40
The Renourishment opinion signifies a potential expansion of the fed-
eral judiciary's protection of constitutionally protected property interests
when the court considers its next major land use case.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Governmental immunity defeats a trial court's jurisdiction and is usu-
ally raised in a plea to the jurisdiction.4 1 But governmental entities do
not enjoy immunity from suits for constitutional violations. 42 For all
other causes of action, they enjoy governmental immunity unless a statute
expressly waives their immunity. 43 Immunity is often used as a shield to
dispose of litigation without ever reaching the merits of a case.
A. BREACH OF CONTRACT
Governmental entities such as water districts often contract with pri-
vate developers to build facilities, which are then conveyed to the public.
Cities that contract with developers to build infrastructure will be subse-
quently reimbursed out of impact fee or other accounts. In 2005, the
Texas Legislature provided for an express waiver of immunity in these
breach of contract claims.
34. Id. at 2597-98.
35. Id. at 2611.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2613.
38. Id. at 2601.
39. Id. at 2616.
40. Id. at 2619.
41. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004).
42. City of Dallas v. Blanton, 200 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
43. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374-75 (Tex. 2006).
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1. Chapter 271, Texas Local Government Code
Section 271.152 of the Local Government Code contains an express
waiver of immunity from suit as to certain breach-of-contract claims:
A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the
constitution to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract
subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the
purpose of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to
the terms and conditions of this subchapter. 44
A "contract subject to this subchapter" is defined as a "written contract
stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or ser-
vices to the local governmental entity that is properly executed on behalf
of the local governmental entity. '45
Thus, for an entity to waive immunity from suit as to contract claims
under section 271.152, the following statutory criteria must be satisfied:
(1) The entity must be "[a] local governmental entity that is authorized
by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract."
(2) The entity must enter into a "contract subject to this subchapter."
(3) The claim must be for breach of contract.46
In Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consolidated Independent School District v.
Texas Political Subdivisions Property/Casualty Joint Self-Insurance
Fund,47 a school district filed a declaratory judgment action against a self-
insurance fund composed of ninety-two local government entities.48 The
school district sought a declaration that a loss it sustained was a "covered
occurrence" under its insurance policy with the fund.49 The fund asserted
governmental immunity.50 After determining the fund enjoyed govern-
mental immunity in its own right, the Texas Supreme Court addressed
whether, in section 271.152, the Legislature waived the fund's immunity
from suit as to the declaratory judgment action.51 The fund asserted sec-
tion 271.152 did not waive immunity because the agreement at issue in
the case-the insurance policy-did not involve the provision of goods or
services to the fund; rather, the fund argued the school district simply
paid the fund for insurance coverage. 52 The supreme court rejected this
argument, noting that although the school district was a consumer of in-
surance that the fund offered, the relationship was not an ordinary con-
sumer/seller relationship because the fund's members (including the
school district) elected a governing board and a board subcommittee that
resolved claims disputes.5 3 The supreme court concluded that, by partici-
44. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 271.152 (Vernon Supp. 2010).
45. Id. § 271.151(2).
46. See id. § 271.152.
47. 212 S.W.3d 320 (Tex. 2006).
48. Id. at 322-23.
49. Id. at 323.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 326-27.
52. Id. at 327.
53. See id.
[Vol. 64
Zoning and Land Use
pating in the election of the fund's governing board, the school district
"provide[d] services to the Fund. ' 54 The supreme court also noted, "by
enacting section 271.152, the Legislature intended to loosen the immunity
bar so 'that all local governmental entities that have been given or are
given the statutory authority to enter into contracts shall not be immune
from suits arising from those contracts." 5 5 Even though the essence of
the agreement (an insurance policy) appeared to be an insurance transac-
tion where the only thing provided to the fund was money, the Ben Bolt
court concluded the agreement fell within the scope of the statute be-
cause the school district was a member of the fund and the fund's mem-
bers elected the fund's governing board.5 6
2. Kirby Lake
Recently, the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Kirby Lake De-
velopment Ltd., v. Clear Lake Water Authority, holding section 271.152
waived immunity from suit in a breach of development agreement.5 7 In
Kirby Lake, residential developers entered into an agreement (entitled
"Sales Agreement and Lease of Facilities") with a water authority,
whereby "the Developers would build water and sewer facilities accord-
ing to the Authority's specifications, and that the Developers would lease
the facilities to the Authority free of charge until the Authority purchased
them. '58 "The Authority agreed to reimburse the Developers 70% of
their construction costs once it received voter-approved bond funds, but
"the Authority was not obligated to reimburse the Developers until a
bond sale was approved in an election." 59 The Developers brought suit
against the Authority alleging it "breached its agreement to include a re-
imbursement provision in the bond election," and the Authority claimed
it was immune from suit.60
The written agreement between the Developer and the Authority met
the definitional requirement for a contract. 61 The supreme court stated
that the relevant inquiry was "whether the Agreements entailed the pro-
vision of 'goods or services' to the Authority. ' 62 The supreme court
noted the agreements at issue were "written contracts stating their essen-
tial terms," and "basic obligations are clearly outlined. '63 Although
chapter 271 provided no definition for "services," generally, "the term is
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing HOUSE COMM. ON CIVIL PRACTICES, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 2039,
79th Leg., R.S. (2005)).
56. Id.
57. 320 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2010).
58. Id. at 832.
59. Id. at 832-33.
60. Id. at 834.
61. Id. at 838.




broad enough to encompass a wide array of activities. '64
The supreme court acknowledged that in Ben Bolt it had "liberally con-
strued [the] government-pooled insurance policy as encompassing 'ser-
vices."' 65 The supreme court also stated that the "services provided thus
need not be the primary purpose of the agreement. '66 The supreme
court concluded that the agreements at issue "entail[ed] services" pro-
vided directly to the Authority: "The Developers contracted to construct,
develop, lease, and bear all risk of loss or damage to the facilities, obliga-
tions far more concrete than those at issue in Ben Bolt. We therefore hold
that the Agreements contemplate the provision of services under the
statute. "67
If the development agreement did not require the hiring of third par-
ties, waiver of immunity occurs even when the developer is merely au-
thorized to hire third parties.68 In the MCR case, MCR entered into a
contract with the authority where "MCR agreed to construct water distri-
bution lines, sewer lines, and drainage facilities to service a nine-acre resi-
dential subdivision proposed to be built on land owned by MCR, and to
construct certain street improvements. ' ' 69 The authority was to repay
MCR out of bond proceeds but never did so.70 When MCR sued the
authority for breach of contract, the authority asserted immunity. 71 No-
ticeably absent from MCR's contract with the authority was an express
provision that MCR was obligated to hire third parties. 72 The First Court
of Appeals nevertheless relied on the Fourteenth Court of Appeals' deci-
sion in Clear Lake, and held the authority's immunity was waived under
section 271.152.73 The appellate court stated the mere fact "that the
Agreement authorized MCR to contract with third parties for the con-
struction of the Facilities along with streets, roads, and bridges, [was] suf-
ficient to constitute the provision of services to the Authority within the
meaning of 271.152." 74
In accord is Wight Realty Interests, Ltd. v. City of Friendswood.75
Wight entered into a contract with the city to construct recreational facili-
64. Id. at 838 (citing Van Zandt v. Fort Worth Press, 359 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1962)
("In ordinary usage the term 'services' has a rather broad and general meaning. It includes
generally any act performed for the benefit of another under some arrangement or agree-
ment whereby such act was to have been performed.")).
65. Id. at 839.
66. Id. (citing Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Friendswood Dev. Co., Ltd., 256 S.W.3d
735, 746 n.13 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. dism'd)).
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. See Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. MCR Corp., No. 01-08-00955-CV, 2010 WL
1053057 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] Mar. 11, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
69. Id. at *1.
70. See id.
71. Id. at *2.
72. See id. at *6-7.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
75. No. 01-10-0042-CV, 2010 WL 5187740 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 23,
2010, no pet.).
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ties and convey these facilities and real property to the city.76 After
Wight bought the land and constructed the facilities, the city cancelled
the contract. Wight brought suit for breach of contract, and the city filed
a plea to the jurisdiction based on immunity.77 Wight's contract involved
acquisition of land and construction of improvements. The First Court of
Appeals, citing Kirby Lake and MCR, held the contract was not just for
the sale of real property and was governed by section 271.152.78
Kirby Lake and other related opinions during the Survey period ex-
pand the ability of contracting parties to file suit enforcing their agree-
ments with governmental entities. It is now clear that governmental
entities do not enjoy immunity from suit for breach of contracts meeting
the requirement of section 271.152.
B. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS
In suits involving causes of action other than constitutional violations
and breach of contract, courts are often asked to invalidate or construe
the language of ordinances, statutes, plats, zoning ordinances, and other
documents. The courts have held there is an express waiver of immunity
when an ordinance is asked to be declared void under section 37.006(b)
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, known as the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act ("UDJA"). 79 This statute expressly states a
city must be made a party to a suit seeking to invalidate an ordinance. 80
There-was a difference of opinion among the appellate courts during the
survey period as to whether the UDJA waives immunity when an ordi-
nance is asked to be construed rather than voided.
1. Cases Holding No Waiver Under UDJA
The Dallas Court of Appeals held the UDJA does not waive immunity
in an ordinance construction case.8a This case involved a dispute between
neighboring property owners and the City of Dallas regarding land shown
to be later dedicated for a street on a 1973 plat. Language in the plat, city
ordinances, and statutes was asked to be construed by the trial court. 82
After the trial court denied its plea to the jurisdiction, the city filed an
interlocutory appeal. 83
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed for several reasons. First, the
appellate court found that section 37.004(a), which gives the court juris-
diction to interpret ordinances, did not expressly require the city to be
76. Id. at *1.
77. Id. at *2.
78. Id. at *4.
79. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.006(b) (Vernon Supp. 2010).
80. Id.
81. City of Dallas v. Turley, 316 S.W.3d 762, 770-71 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet.
filed).




named a party. 4 This was distinguished from the language in section
37.006(b). 85
Second, the appellate court cited to a recent Texas Supreme Court
opinion that immunity would only be waived under the UDJA in an ultra
vires action.86 In Texas Department of Insurance v. Reconveyance Ser-
vices, Inc., the supreme court held the UDJA must be brought against
governmental officials in ultra vires actions.87
The Dallas Court of Appeals also cites to State v. BP America Produc-
tion Co. for the proposition that the city has immunity unless appellees'
claims challenge the validity of city ordinances. 88 It is important to note
this case is pending before the supreme court, which requested briefs
from both parties on their respective petitions for review. BP brought
declaratory judgment causes of action asking the court of appeals to con-
strue language in the parties' deeds and leases.89 None of these causes of
action involved the construction of an ordinance or statute with a munici-
pal party defendant.
The court of appeals did not address the language in section 37.004(a),
which states a governmental entity whose pronouncements are declared
pursuant to the UDJA must be made a party to the litigation if the city
has an interest in the outcome. 90 Here, the city's interest was in the
court's interpretation of city documents and ordinances. Several courts
of appeals disagree with the holdings in Turley.
2. Cases Holding UDJA Waives Immunity
One of the opinions controverted by the holdings in Turley is the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals' opinion in City of Crowley v. Ray.9t Similar to
the City of Dallas, Crowley argued immunity was not waived because
"Ray did not plead that a statute or ordinance is ambiguous or invalid."'92
Instead, Ray asked the trial court to make declarations about various
floodplain documents. The court of appeals held the list of documents
construed in section 37.004 is not exhaustive; this was the type of case
envisioned for declaratory relief and the city was a necessary party.93
The Ray court points out that sections 37.002(b) and 37.003(c) of the
UDJA provide additional support for the proposition that the UDJA
84. Id. at 768-69.
85. Id. at 768.
86. Id. at 770.
87. Id. (citing Tex. Dep't of Ins. v. Reconveyance Servs., Inc., 306 S.W.3d 256 (Tex.
2010)).
88. Id. at 768 (citing State v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 290 S.W.3d 345 (Tex. App. Austin-
2009, pet. filed).
89. BP Am. Prod. Co., 290 S.W.3d at 359.
90. See TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2010).
91. No. 2-09-290-CV, 2010 WL 1006278 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Mar. 18, 2010, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id. at *5-6.
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waives immunity.94 Construing the UDJA in its entirety, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals held because Ray's request for declaratory relief did
not seek monetary damages and would remove uncertainties as to City
documents, Crowley's immunity was deemed waived. 95
The El Paso Court of Appeals similarly held immunity did not apply to
a declaratory judgment cause of action requesting construction of the
Uniform Relocation Act. 96 The appellees did not ask that an ordinance
or statute be invalidated. Instead, they asked the appellate court for a
declaration that their constitutional rights had been violated. The court
of appeals held that "suits requiring compliance with statutory or consti-
tutional provisions are not prohibited by immunity even if the compliance
involves the payment of money."'97
Immunity was also deemed waived in a suit seeking a declaration of
rights (not invalidation) under an ordinance regarding the construction of
driveways. 98 Wayne asked the appellate court to declare his driveway
grandfathered under the ordinance, and the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals held the city's immunity had been waived.99 Wayne did not seek
monetary damages and did not ask to invalidate an ordinance.
A city's plea to the jurisdiction based on immunity was similarly denied
in Gatesco v. City of Rosenberg.100 Gatesco filed suit to challenge the
city's water and sewer charges, which Gatesco claimed violated city ordi-
nances. Gatesco did not ask that a city ordinance be declared invalid.
The court of appeals affirmed the rule that governmental entities do not
enjoy governmental immunity as to declaratory relief in an ordinance
construction case unless money damages are being requested. 101 In ac-
cord is the Amarillo Court of Appeals opinion in Potter County v. Tuck-
ness.102 The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that "governmental
immunity is not a bar to suits seeking a declaration of a party's rights
under a statute or regulation. 10 3 It appears the Texas Supreme Court
will ultimately make the decision on this issue.
III. COUNTY AND EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Most land use litigation involves a municipality because counties gener-
ally do not have zoning authority.104 In addition, home rule cities have
94. Id. at *5.
95. Id. at *6.
96. City of El Paso v. Bustillos, 324 S.W.3d 200, 207 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2010, no
pet.).
97. Id.
98. City of Victoria v. Wayne, No. 13-09-00695-CV, 2010 WL 1509566, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi Apr. 15, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.).
99. Id. at *1, *3.
100. 312 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
101. Id.
102. 308 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2010, no pet.).
103. Id. at 429.
104. Compare TEX. Loc. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 211.003 (West 2007) (granting zoning
authority to municipalities) with TEX. Loc. GOVT CODE ANN §§ 231.001-.257 (West 2007)
(granting zoning authority in limited circumstances).
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independent police powers outside of limited statutory authority that is
unavailable to counties.10 5 Because significant land area is located
outside of municipal boundaries, there were repeated attempts to
broaden county land use regulatory authority by statute.10 6 Whether
these suggested statutory changes will be approved during what is antici-
pated to be a tumultuous 2011 session remains to be seen.
Despite the statutory limitation, several opinions were issued involving
counties and cities with extraterritorial jurisdiction authority during the
survey period. County platting authority was addressed in Mattox v.
Grimes County Commissioners Court.10 7 Appellants purchased lots in a
platted subdivision and then "learned that a portion of an unpaved dedi-
cated roadway encroached upon the lots."10 8 They filed an application
with the county commissioners court to cancel the dedication under sec-
tion 232.008(e).
During the public hearing, the appellants presented evidence that their
application met the statutory requirements for cancellation, thus county
approval of their application was mandatory and nondiscretionary.10 9 In
response, the county and adjoining landowner argued the county had dis-
cretion to deny the cancellation application if it "will prevent the pro-
posed interconnection of infrastructure to pending or existing
development.""l0 The adjoining landowner stated at the hearing that the
subject road was necessary to allow future subdivision of the adjoining
property. The appellate court denied the application, and appellants filed
a petition for writ of mandamus with the district court."'
Both sides presented motions for summary judgment on the issues of
whether there was a proposed roadway interconnector between the two
landowners or whether there was pending and existing development on
the adjoining property. The trial court granted the county's motion,
which was later reversed by the court of appeals.
As to the first element, the court of appeals stated the term "proposed"
meant "intended."' 1 2 Because the parties presented controverting evi-
dence on whether the interconnecting roadway was intended to link the
two properties, the appellate court found there was a material fact issue
and summary judgment could not be granted for either party at this point.
The court of appeals also found controverting evidence was introduced
on the second issue and summary judgment should not have been granted
105. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5; Texas v. Portillo, 314 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 2010, no pet.).
106. Capital Area Council of Gov'ts, County Land Use Authority in Texas, 17 (Nov.
2009), available at http://www.capcog.org/information-clearinghouse/publications/ (follow
"Adobe PDF" hyperlink under "County Land Use Authority in Texas" heading).
107. 305 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).
108. Id. at 377.
109. Id. at 378.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 384.
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for either party. 113
In her dissent, Justice Frost reached the same result as the court of
appeals but on different grounds. She would have held section 232.008
only authorized cancellation of an entire subdivision, not cancellation of
an easement or roadway only.114 Because Mattox sought relief unavaila-
ble under the statute, she believed the commissioners court was not man-
dated to approve the application.1 1 5
In In re Bouse, an area in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of
College Station (known as Wellborn) filed an initiative petition with the
city secretary seeking consent that College Station allow Wellborn to in-
corporate as its own municipality. 1 6 The city secretary ruled the peti-
tions defective under section 42.041 of the Local Government Code.
The city's charter provided for an initiative process where refusal of
city council to adopt a resolution required a matter to be put up for elec-
torate vote. The city council refused to certify the petition and called an
election.
The Texas Municipal League and the Texas City Attorneys Association
submitted amicus briefs supporting the city's position.11 7 There were two
questions for the appellate court to answer. First, is the initiative referen-
dum process consistent with incorporation election procedures in section
42.041? Second, did the city fail to perform a ministerial duty to certify
the sufficiency of the initiative petition and call the incorporation
election?
Answering the first question in the negative, the appellate court did not
reach the second question. The appellate court analogized the incorpora-
tion process to the annexation/disannexation process because they both
address municipal boundaries.118 Previous case law held the initiative
process cannot be used in an annexation or disannexation context." 9 In
holding the initiative process was inapplicable, the appellate court did not
reach the issue of whether the petition met the technical requirements of
the charter.120
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Gray argued that "the right to proceed by
an initiative election should be liberally construed in favor of" those seek-
ing to exercise that right.12 ' The dissent pointed out chapter 42 of the
Local Government Code was not intended to be exhaustive and further
pointed out any reliance on the annexation procedures in chapter 43 was
113. Id. at 385.
114. Id. at 391 (Frost, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Frost, J., dissenting).
116. 324 S.W.3d 240, 242 (Tex. App.-Waco 2010, pet. denied).
117. Id.
118. See id. at 244.
119. See, e.g., Vara v. City of Houston, 583 S.W.2d 935,938-39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hitchcock v. City of Longmire, 572 S.W.2d 122, 127
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston fist Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e).
120. In re Bouse, 324 S.W.3d at 244.




The case makes clear that the consent of a municipality in whose extra-
territorial jurisdiction lies in an area seeking separate incorporation is re-
quired, but this consent is not compelled through an initiative election
even if such a process is provided for in the city charter. In other words, a
city has virtually sole discretion to allow an area in its extraterritorial
jurisdiction to incorporate.
In Shumaker Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Austin, a sand and gravel min-
ing business sought to develop a 470-acre tract just outside of Austin.123
When the development process began, Shumaker filed a required mining
permit application with the county. Prior to this permit being approved,
a portion of the Shumaker property was brought into the city's extraterri-
torial jurisdiction. The county later approved the permit only for that
portion located outside of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 124 Shumaker
claimed that having filed its permit with the county, the city was pre-
vented from requiring it to file a permit with the city as well under chap-
ter 245 of the Local Government Code. This statute protects
development projects by "locking in" the effective ordinances at the time
the first permit application for a project is filed.
The appellate court held for the City of Austin, however, reasoning
chapter 245 operates only to lock in place the requirements of a particu-
lar regulatory regime.125 Because the city requirements could not apply
until Shumaker's property was in the extraterritorial jurisdiction, Shu-
maker could not trigger the protections of chapter 245 against the city by
submitting a permit application with the county.
The appellate court found the applicant did not provide "fair notice" of
his project to the city by only filing an application with the county. 126
Finally, the appellate court analyzed section 242.001(c) of the Local Gov-
ernment Code, which states a city's extraterritorial jurisdiction expansion
over property subject to a preliminary or final plat does not affect any
rights accrued under chapter 245. Because the section refers to subdivi-
sions and not mining operations, the appellate court held the vested
rights protections of chapter 245 did not apply.' 27
IV. REGULATORY TAKINGS
In City of Carrollton v. RIHR Inc., the city refused to issue building
permits unless the applicant provided funding for remediation of a retain-
ing wall. 128 The plaintiff purchased several lots in a previously con-
structed subdivision containing the retaining wall. After the wall
122. Id. at 254-55 (Gray, J., dissenting).
123. 325 S.W.3d 812, 813 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, no pet.).
124. Id. at 813.
125. Id. at 813, 816.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 815.
128. 308 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. denied).
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collapsed, Carrollton notified the developer it was a threat to public
safety. The city further refused to issue building permits until the owner
fixed the wall.129
RIHR purchased two lots in the subdivision out of foreclosure, neither
of which was adjacent to the wall. The city refused to issue the building
permits for the two lots. After Carrollton repaired the wall at the city's
costs, it informed RIHR that the permits would be released if RIHR paid
one-third of the remediation cost to the city. RIHR then filed an inverse
condemnation suit. The trial court signed an order for a temporary in-
junction, holding "that the collapsed retaining wall was not on and did
not affect" RIHR's lots, and compelled RIHR to issue the permits. 130
RIHR subsequently built the two houses.13'
After trial, RIHR was awarded damages and attorneys' fees. The test
for a land use exaction is set forth in Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford
Estates, LP.132 The city argued that no exaction occurred because the
remediation fee was never actually paid.
The appellate court held that merely holding up the permits issuance
constituted an exaction. 133 It stated "[e]ven if the collapsed wall
presented a condition adverse to the public safety ... there [was] no con-
nection between remediation of the collapsed wall and Carrollton's exac-
tion.' 34 The trial court held RIHR was harmed due to the project's
delay caused by the city. RIHR was entitled to recover its out-of-pocket
expenses.135
In 2800 La Frontera No. 1A, Ltd. v. City of Round Rock, an appellate
held owners of land in a Planned Unit Development (PUD) did not have
a legitimate takings or spot zoning claim against the city when the city
created new PUDs on adjacent lands. 136 The city and developer entered
into an agreement requiring developer consent to any major zoning
changes to PUD 39. After new developers sought to amend PUD 39 ad-
ding multi-family units, the city asked the plaintiffs to consent. After
they refused to consent, the new developers filed application to create
new PUD's later granted by the city.137 The owners brought suit against
the city for violation of the agreement, inverse condemnation, spot zon-
ing, violation of their substantive due process rights, and promissory es-
toppel. The appellate court determined the creation and zoning of the
new PUDs was valid and did not violate the development agreement.
Because zoning is a legislative function that the city cannot relinquish by
prior agreement, it would "surrender its authority to determine proper
129. Id.
130. Id. at 448.
131. Id.
132. 71 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002) affid 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004).
133. City of Carollton, 308 S.W.3d at 451.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 453.
136. No. 03-08-00790-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 243, at *8, *25-26, *29 (Tex. App.-
Austin Jan. 12, 2010, no pet.) (mer. op.).
137. Id. at *4.
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land use by contract."'138
On the inverse condemnation claim, the appellate court used the test
set out in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City that
examines "(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2)
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with the reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government
action."' 139 First, the appellate court found the owners' property value
was reduced by $2.7 million. While a significant amount of money in ab-
solute terms, the appellate court found it to be a de minimis reduction of
only 4%.140
The appellate court then determined that "the Owners' reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations are no greater than any other land owner
subject to 'conventional' municipal zoning" and that the creation of the
new PUDs did not "alter[ ] the existing or permitted uses of the Owner's
property" or their primary expectation. 141 Finally, as to the character of
the governmental order, "the new PUDs were crafted to 'create a more
modern pedestrian-friendly and urban environment."' 142 The city did not
specifically target the owners but created the new PUDs and zoning as
expected in growing communities. The appellate court held the rezoning
did not go "too far" and there were no takings. 143
V. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
In most cases, it is difficult to judicially override a board of adjustment
decision under the abuse of discretion standard the courts utilize to re-
view the record. 44 A recent Corpus Christi Court of Appeals opinion
confirmed that virtually any evidence introduced at a board hearing can
be used to justify the board's decision. In Sea Mist Council of Owners v.
Town of South Padre Island Board of Adjustments, a letter from a town
official was held to constitute sufficient evidence to uphold the board's
building permits allowing a condominium unit to be remodeled for a cafe
selling alcoholic beverages. 45 The issue in the case was whether this use
was allowed in the "B" business district.
The city's zoning ordinance did not specifically allow the sale of alco-
holic beverages in the "B" business district governing the building. 146 A
letter from the building official was introduced stating the city routinely
allowed restaurants in the "B" district to sell alcoholic beverages. This
138. Id. at *6, *35 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
139. Id. at *10.
140. Id. at *14.
141. Id. at *16-19.
142. Id. at *20.
143. Id. at *21, *25.
144. See Sea Mist Council of Owners v. Town of S. Padre Island Bd. of Adjustments,
No. 13-10-011-CV, 2010 WL 2784081, at *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi July 15, 2010, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
145. Id. at *3.
146. See id. at *2.
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evidence was sufficient to ratify the board's decision to uphold the build-
ing official's granting of the permit.
A similar approach is found in Christopher Columbus Street Market
LLC v. Zoning Board of Adjustments of the City of Galveston.147 The
building in this case was located in Galveston's East End Historical Dis-
trict. The main structure was built in 1880 and two additions were built in
1920. Although the city staff granted the property owner's permit re-
quest demolishing the two additions due to its unsafe condition, the city's
Landmark Commission denied the owner's permit demolishing the entire
structure.
148
Both the property owner and the city introduced expert reports from
structural engineers. The city's expert opined demolishing the addition
was feasible and care should be taken to avoid damage to the main struc-
ture. The property owners appealed to the Zoning Board of Adjust-
ments, which voted 4-1 "to deny the Property Owner's appeal and uphold
the Landmark Commission's decision." 149
The court of appeals held that as long as the record contained "some
evidence of substantive and probative character to justify the . . . deci-
sion" there was no abuse of discretion. 150 The property owners argued
the city's expert report did not address the condition of the main struc-
ture and the only competent evidence therefore was the property owners'
expert report that argued the main structure was not feasibly salvage-
able. 151 An expert structural engineer for the city orally testified, how-
ever, that the main structure was salvageable. Because the property
owner failed to meet its burden proving the board could have reached but
one decision and not the one it made, the court of appeals upheld the
city's denial of the demolition permit application. 152
VI. PREEMPTION
The issue of preemption of local land use regulations and state statute
was addressed in Southern Crushed Concrete, LLC v. City of Houston.153
"In October 2003, Southern applied to the [Texas Natural Resource Con-
servation Commission (TNRCC)] for a permit to move a portable con-
crete-crushing facility to property ... in Houston."'1 54 Before action was
taken on the application, the Presbyterian School Outdoor Education
Center located near this property. In addition, the Houston City Council
approved an "ordinance prohibiting concrete-crushing operations . . .
within 1500 feet" of a tract, which various uses, including a school, are
147. 302 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
148. Id. at 411.
149. Id. at 412.
150. Id. at 416.
151. Id. at 417-18.
152. Id. at 418-19.
153. No. 14-09-00873-CV, 2010 WL 4638417, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Nov. 17, 2010, no pet. h.).
154. Id. at *2.
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located. 155 "Because the school had not been built at the time Southern
applied for a permit," the TNRCC granted the permit.'56 But the city
denied Southern's application due to the municipal regulations on
location. 157
The court of appeals disagreed with Southern's argument that the
Texas Clean Air Act preempted the local ordinance. 158 Southern argued
the city required a bigger buffer zone than the standard set forth in the
statute. According to the appellate court, however, simply because "the
legislature has enacted a law addressing a subject does not mean the sub-
ject matter is completely preempted. '159
The court of appeals found Houston's ordinance and state statute were
consistent. 160 The stated purpose of the Texas Clean Air Act is to protect
the state's air. Houston's ordinance, on the other hand, serves a different
purpose: separation of potentially incompatible land uses. 161 As a result,
the court of appeals held the ordinance was consistent and valid. 162
In his dissent, Justice Brown states the intent in passing the ordinance
is irrelevant. 63 The dissent defines "inconsistent" as a "local enactment
that attempts to regulate in a more or less restrictive way the same activ-
ity a statute already directly regulates."1 64 Because the city's distance re-
quirements were inconsistent and more restrictive than the statute, the
dissent would have held the city's ordinance to be unconstitutional.1 65
VII. CONCLUSION
A number of major land use decisions were rendered during the survey
period. On the whole, the general trend of these decisions was to expand
protection of private property rights at the expense of governmental reg-
ulation of land. The Severance opinion indicates the Texas Supreme
Court's willingness to override statutes such as the OBA if viewed as in-
fringing on constitutionally protected property rights. 166 In Kirby Lake,
the court empowered developers to file suit in breach of development
suits.' 67 A major question remains as to whether immunity is waived in
declaratory judgment actions. While private parties do not always prevail
in the appellate courts, the courts generally ruled on the side of private




158. Id. at *7.
159. Id. at *4 (Internal citation and quotation omitted).
160. Id. at *6.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *9 (Brown, J. dissenting).
164. Id. at *10 (Brown, J., dissenting).
165. Id.
166. See generally, Severance v. Patterson, No.09-0387, 2010 WL 4371438 (Tex. Nov. 5,
2010).
167. See generally, Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d
829 (Tex. 2010).
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